puddlepirate wrote:Plessey, Marconi and GE made comms kit for ships and other naval/military installations (including, for HM ships, the onboard telephone switching equipment). BT T1/T2 ccts were used for the DCN and DTN. BT also managed the LF transmitters at Rugby (the tall antenna masts located at the site and which used to be visible from the M1 motorway, have since been taken down). At Bentwaters, in a space behind the ops room (now part of the BWCM) was the BT frame room that contained the IDF, MDF and - I think but this needs to be cnfirmed - the Strowger switching kit. Again I'm not absolutely sure but on the other side of the ops room corridor, opposite to the BT frame room was the interface with the US Autovon system.
Georgina Bruni stated in YCTP on p246 (Pan Books, London (2001) paperback edition; ISBN 0 330 39021 X) that there was a huge increase in flash traffic at the time of the incident. Flash (Z) is the highest precedence for signal messages and has a desk to desk handling time of 'as fast as humanly possible, within ten minutes' because of this flash messages use an abbreviated format, are very short and sent unencrypted. They are most frequently used to inform the command or officers in the field of a crucial situation, e.g. to warn of an imminent enemy attack or so forth where encryption is not necessary. The exception being a comms check message sent from the operators at each end of a circuit to make sure a circuit is up and working. Generally speaking a 'releasing officer' will authorise the release of signal message and approve the precedence. On the Autovon system only certain persons were authorised to use 'flash' for telephone traffic. Use of 'flash' for telephone calls would bump all lower predence traffic on the telephone system. Therefore, nobody used 'flash' unless the situation was very serious indeed - and had been confirmed as such, i.e.the threat has been confirmed, is imminent and the situaion is grave. Nobody uses 'flash' to get his or her boss out of bed to report odd lights. The base would had to have been under attack (which we know it was not) or there had to have been a confirmed incident of such severity that commanders of certain UK USAF bases, pehaps also MoD and probably also USAF bases in Europe, most likely Ramstein, had to be informed as a matter of utmost urgency. If what GB states is true, then whatever happened had to be serious, very serious indeed. Even during major NATO exercises, the highest precedence for most signal message traffic was Immediate (O).
During 1980, aircraft were dropping out of the east of England sky like flies. Not only USAF but also RAF aircraft (from Hansard, 1995)
12 February Hunter FGA9 Isle of Skye
5 March Phantom FGR2 RAF Coningsby, Lincolnshire
12 March Harrier GR3 2¾ nm SE of Lampeter, Dyfed
17 March Hunter GA11 English Channel, 10 nm SSW of Start Point
29 April F-111E Mappenton, Dorset
8 May Jet Provost T5A Near RAF Swinderby, Lincolnshire
17 May Hawk T1 Brighton sea front, Sussex
28 May Hunter FGA9 3 nm SE of Dufftown, Morayshire
29 May Hunter T7 1 nm S of Little Saxham, Suffolk
3 June Phantom FG1 RAF Alconbury, Cambridgeshire
31 July Jet Provost T3A ½ nm S of RAF Elvington, North Yorkshire
19 August Hawk T1 RAF Valley, Anglesey
12 November Phantom FGR2 North Sea, 50 nm NE of Cromer
17 November Nimrod MR2 RAF Kinloss, Morayshire
18 November 2 x A-10A Great Yarmouth, Norfolk
1 December Sea Harrier FRS1 English Channel, 25 nm S of Land's End
9 December Phantom FGR2 North Sea, 10 nm NE of Lowestoft
Aircraft accidents were no big secret and were frequently reported in the local press complete with photos. Therefore the RFI was not an aircraft accident per se, at least not a regular aircraft accident.
i've not posted for ages and I've no intention of posting again. The answer is there - go look for it but don't bother looking under UFO because you'll be wasting your time.
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